What Really Creates a Trade Surplus: Currency or Productive Capacity?

A recent Foreign Affairs article argues that China's growing trade surplus is largely the result of an undervalued currency.

The authors contend that a weaker renminbi has made Chinese exports more competitive, contributed to widening global trade imbalances, and intensified pressures on manufacturers in Europe and the United States.

Exchange rates undoubtedly affect prices and competitiveness.

No serious observer would deny this.

The real question is whether exchange-rate movements can explain the extraordinary scale of China's manufacturing success.

A significant currency movement affects export competitiveness, import demand, investment decisions, and trade balances.

No serious observer would deny this.

But does currency undervaluation explain China's rise as a manufacturing powerhouse?

Or are we mistaking a contributing factor for the primary cause?

To answer this question, it is useful to begin with a simple thought experiment.

If currency undervaluation creates export success, why doesn't every country with a weak currency become a manufacturing superpower?

Many countries have experienced prolonged periods of currency weakness.

Some have seen their currencies depreciate dramatically.

Yet very few have become China.

Very few have developed globally dominant manufacturing sectors.

Very few have built integrated industrial ecosystems capable of producing everything from textiles and consumer goods to high-speed rail systems, advanced batteries, ships, industrial machinery, telecommunications equipment, and electric vehicles.

Clearly, something more than exchange rates is at work.

The central weakness in many discussions of global trade is the tendency to focus on prices while overlooking capabilities.

Exchange rates influence prices.

Productive capacity determines capabilities.

And capabilities ultimately determine what a country can produce, how efficiently it can produce it, and whether the world wishes to buy it.

China's rise cannot be understood without examining the extraordinary expansion of its productive capacity over the last four decades.

Factories.

Industrial parks.

Ports.

Railways.

Power generation.

Technical education.

Research institutions.

Supply chains.

Engineering capabilities.

Manufacturing clusters.

Logistics networks.

The creation of this industrial ecosystem required decades of investment, planning, learning, and coordination.

A stronger currency would not eliminate these capabilities.

Nor would a weaker currency create them from scratch.

Imagine that the renminbi appreciated by 20 percent tomorrow.

Chinese factories would still exist.

Chinese engineers would still possess their skills.

Chinese ports would still move enormous volumes of cargo.

Chinese firms would still possess deep supply chains and manufacturing expertise.

China's competitiveness might be affected.

But its productive capacity would remain.

Now consider the opposite scenario.

Suppose a country with limited industrial capability devalued its currency by 20 percent.

Would it suddenly acquire world-class factories?

Would it instantly create industrial clusters?

Would it develop advanced manufacturing ecosystems overnight?

Of course not.

A weaker currency can influence competitiveness.

It cannot substitute for productive capacity.

This distinction is critical because productive capacity is ultimately what generates sustained trade surpluses.

Countries export because they produce things that others wish to buy.

The more productive, efficient, and technologically capable their industries become, the greater their ability to compete in global markets.

Exchange rates may amplify or dampen that competitiveness.

They do not create it.

This does not mean currency policy is irrelevant.

China has historically managed its exchange rate.

Many other countries have done the same.

Exchange-rate movements can influence trade flows, particularly over shorter periods.

The authors of the Foreign Affairs article are therefore correct to argue that exchange rates deserve attention.

But exchange rates alone cannot explain why China has become the world's manufacturing center.

The deeper explanation lies in productive capacity.

In fact, one could argue that China's trade surplus reflects decades of successful industrialization more than it reflects exchange-rate management.

China did not become an export powerhouse because it possessed an undervalued currency.

Rather, it maintained export strength because it built extraordinary productive capabilities.

This distinction matters because it changes the policy discussion.

If exchange rates are the primary explanation, then currency appreciation becomes the primary solution.

If productive capacity is the primary explanation, then the challenge facing other countries is far more demanding.

They must rebuild industrial capabilities.

They must strengthen infrastructure.

They must invest in skills, technology, logistics, energy systems, and manufacturing ecosystems.

They must improve their own productive capacity.

The world's trade imbalances are real.

But understanding their causes requires looking beyond exchange rates.

There is another perspective often missing from trade discussions.

Exports are not an end in themselves.

When a country exports, it sends real goods and services abroad that could otherwise have been consumed domestically.

Imports, by contrast, are real goods and services received from the rest of the world.

In that sense, exports are the price paid for imports.

The purpose of trade is therefore not simply to maximize exports.

It is to obtain the greatest possible real benefit for its people from the exchange.

Countries export because doing so allows them to acquire goods, technologies, resources, and opportunities that improve the welfare and productive capacity of their own people.

The ultimate objective is not exports.

The ultimate objective is rising living standards.

The most important question is not:

"How cheap are Chinese goods?"

The more important question is:

"Why is China able to produce so many goods that the world wants to buy?"

The answer to that question lies not primarily in currency markets.

It lies in factories, engineers, infrastructure, technology, organization, and productive capacity.

Exchange rates influence competitiveness.

But productive capacity determines what a country is capable of competing with.


Rajendra Rasu
The author writes on monetary systems and political economy